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POLICE, STATE SECURITY FORCES AND HUMAN




I. Dynamics of Organization, Administration and Community
Interaction of Police and State Security Forces
A. Introduction: The Mandate of Police
The term "police" denotes an integral part of a government and its
administration. As a unit, it represents a department of a government to
maintain law and order among its other residual functions.' The mandate
of police is to exercise reasonable control in the course of interplay of
their extensive powers underlined by broad discretion. This is necessary
for the requisite balance between peaceful enjoyment of individual rights
and security of rights and interests of state for and on behalf of the
People. 2 Consequently, an act by police or state security forces considered
unreasonable, capricious, arbitrary or improperly motivated is beyond
police mandate to exercise reasonable control, therefore ultra-vires their
authority. An act beyond the confines of law adversely impacting indivi-
duals in contact with police and state security forces constitutes a violation
of fundamental human rights. We have called on the establishment of
police to serve and obey the law prior to their performance as state
operatives.
* Senior Legal Specialist, Near Eastern and African Law Division, Law Library, Library of
Congress.
1. See generally WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 910 (1984).
2. See generally, Charles Mwalimu, Police and Human Rights Practices in Nigeria: A Primer
Case Study Toward Complete Enjoyment of Fundamental Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa, 5
EMORY INT'L. L. Rav. 515 (1991) [hereinafter Police in Nigeria]; see also Charles Mwalimu, Police,
State Security Forces and Constitutionalism of Human Rights in Zambia, 21 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP.
L. 217 (1991) [hereinafter Police in Zambia].
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The mandate of police demands that the constitutional edifice of
police and state security forces must reflect their functionary disposition
as primary tools of Law and not manipulative instruments of political
elites and other dominant classes in the state. Mixed loyalties as to the
proper repository of police powers essentially undermines the scope of
compliance by law enforcement agents to norms of fundamental human
rights. As long as police are primarily oriented to protect the regime in
power, sustenance of rights unabridged is untenable to the detriment of
people in the state. Police and security forces must be returned to their
proper law enforcement function to ensure the sanctity of fundamental
human rights of the individual.3
B. History, Development and Organization of the Nigerian and
Zambian Police
Nigerian and Zambian pre-colonial policing arrangements are similar.
They both functioned under unwritten norms of customary laws indigent
to local people in these territories. They were designed to address multiple
functions such as internal maintenance of law and order and external
protection of kingships and chieftainships in modalities akin to military
forces.
In Nigeria, indigenous society, by recourse to informal detail of
messengers to facilitate judicial process also exercised social control by
similar informal process including mystic powers of the supernatural.4 In
Zambia, on the other hand, the Lozi of western Zambia have been cited
to utilize the modern hierarchical arrangement of police powers traced
from the village headman to the paramount chief. Personalities of local
potentates were crucial to the success of the policing systems enhanced
by tribal customs.' Colonial policing systems for both countries were
established primarily to protect settler interests in Nigeria traced to 18616
and in Zambia to 1889 when the British South African Company (B.S.A.C.)
3. Id. See further, Charles Mwalimu, The Influence of Constitutions on the Development of
a Nation's Law and Legal System: The Case of Zambia and Nigeria, 8 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. Rav.
157 (1989) [hereinafter Influence of Constitutions].
4. Police in Nigeria, supra note 2; see also TEKENA N. TAmJNo, THE POLICE IN MODERN
NIOERIA 1861-1965: Osuous, DEVELOPMENT, AND ROLE (1970); T.N. Tamuno, Before British Police
in Nigeria, Nia. MAO. 102 (June 1966); and SUNDAY GABRIEL EHINDERO, POLICE AND THE LAW IN
NIOERIA (1986).
5. JAMES C.AMER, THE WORLD'S POLICE 221-226 (1964); see also ZAMBIA: A COUNTRY STUDY
223-238 (Irving Kaplan ed. 1979, 3d printing 1987).
6. Influence of Constitutions, supra note 3.
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of Cecil Rhodes was granted a Royal Charter. This instrument constituted
official recognition of the Company as a British Corporation to acquire
and exploit minerals and administer North-Eastern and North-Western
Rhodesia while protecting traditional rulers from external threats by force
of arms.7
The legal framework of the Nigerian police also goes back to 1863
when Hausa Police were formalized as "security forces" consolidated in
1879 and 1895.8 Because of conflicts between local inhabitants and settlers,
the Rivers Protectorate Police Force was established in 1890, and super-
seded the following year by the Hausa constabulary. 9 The Hausa Con-
stabulary was later redesignated as the Niger Coast Protectorate Police
with a strength of 500 police.' 0 The Lagos Guard is also a manifestation
of historical developments of the Nigeria Police Force organized as early
as 1840 to 1860 to address socio-political disturbances between settlers
and indigenous people." Corresponding to the three political subdivisions
of Lagos, Northern and Southern Nigeria, police also developed in support
of these administrative structures evidenced in the Constabulary Procla-
mation of 1906. 12 The three classifications of Lagos Police Force, Northern
Nigeria Police Constabulary and Southern Nigeria Police Force appears
to have been maintained, even with the amalgamation of the northern
and southern portions of the country in 1914.13 Under Ordinance, No.2
of 1930,' 4 however, the three systems of police in Lagos, Northern and
Southern were united to form the Nigeria Police Force (N.P.F.). Pursuant
to the federal Constitution of 1954,"5 both the federal capital territory at
Lagos and the regions in the East, North and West jointly administered
the police. Under the Constitution of 1963, coinciding with the creation
of the Mid-Western Region of Nigeria, effective 1964, Nigeria Police were
administered in five command areas.' 6 Commissioners of Police in the
7. Id.
8. Ordinances of the Settlement of Lagos 1862-1870, 10 (1874); see also Ordinances of the
colony of Lagos 1893, 18 (1894).
9. Police in Nigeria supra note 2; see also Constabulary Disciplinary Ordinance No. 4, 1892,
Ordinances of the Colony of Lagos 1893, 643 (1894).
10. See Police ordinance, No. 14 of 1897 and Proclamation No. 4 of 1902 consolidated as
Police Ordinance, 1 The Laws of the Colony of Southern Nigeria, ch. 34, 446 (1908).
11. S.G. EHINDERO, supra note 4.
12. 1906 Northern Nigeria Proclamations 59.
13. Police in Nigeria, supra note 2.
14. 1930 Nigeria Ordinances 25, repealed in 1942, effective 1943 consolidated in 5 The Laws
of Nigeria, ch. 172, 254 (1948).
15. Influence of Constitutions, supra note 3.
16. Ann. Rep. of the Nigeria Police Force (1964).
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Regions commanded the Forces subject to the overall command of the
Inspector-General of Police at the center. In 1978, the Nigeria Police
force was organized in five departments of "A" to "F" with a strength
spanning 2,222 in 1926 to 84,955 in 1979.1 Since its establishment, the
Nigeria Police Force has functioned alongside Native or Local Authority
police forces. 8 These forces were integrated into the Nigeria Police Force
in 1969 and 1972.19 Under the Constitution of 1979,20 the Nigeria Police
Force is recognized in articles 194-196 as a unitary force, to the exclusion
of all other forces." Therefore, current regimes of law providing the legal
framework of the Nigeria police is the Constitution of Nigeria, 1979
complemented by legislation issued under it. The Constitution of 1979 is
soon to be replaced in 1992 on the return of the country to civilian rule.22
Police exercise their powers under the Police Act, 1943 as amended. 23
Under these measures, primary functions of the Nigeria Police Force
include maintenance of law and order, prosecution of offenses, protection
of property and other functions of general law enforcement. The present
configuration of the Force corresponds to twenty-one territorial demar-
cations of states including the newly-created Katsina and Ikwa-Ibom states.
The organizational structure is by and large hierarchical. 24
In Zambia, the legal framework of police is traced to 1891, when a
small constabulary was established to protect settler commercial interests
and safeguard their welfare.25 That unit was also created to provide a
buffer against incursions of Arab slave traders, though it also carried out
civil police duties. Two sections of this constabulary functioned in North-
Eastern Rhodesia 26 and the Barotse Native Police operated in North
17. See generally Ann. Rep. of the Nigeria Police Force 1926-1979. The Force plans to expand
to 200,000 by the 1990s, a ratio of 1:500 people per officer to cater to a population of 112 million
people.
18. Native Police Ordinance, No. 17 of 1943, Ann. vol of the Laws Nigeria, ch. 140, 479
(1948); The Native Authority Law of Northern Nigeria, 1954, 2 The Laws Northern Nigeria, ch. 77,
1275 (1963); Local Government Law of Western Region of Nigeria, 1955, 4 The Laws of the Western
Region of Nigeria, ch. 70, 19 (1959).
19. NIOERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 275-276 (Harold D. Nelson ed., 4th ed. 1982).
20. Annual Volume of the Laws of Nigeria (Ann. Vol. L.N.). (appendix 119 p. 1979).
21. Influence of Constitutions, supra note 3.
22. Rep. of the Pol. Bureau 103 (Mar. 1987); see also Charles Mwalimu, Trends in African
Law (Nigeria), in A.B.A. SEc. INT'L L., AFR. L. COMM., NEWSL. (Spring 1990 and Jan. 1991).
23. 5 Laws of Nigeria, ch. 172, 257 (1948); see also 5 The Laws of the Fed. Rep. of Nig. and
Lagos, ch. 154, 2928 (1959) reprinted under Decree, No. 41 of 1967, Ann. Vol. L.N. A189 (1967).
24. Police in Nigeria, supra note 2. The Police Act is reinforced by Police Regulations, Ann.
Vol. L.N. B149 (1968).
25. The State Law of Northern Rhodesia 1889-1901, at 1 (1910).
26. Police in Zambia, supra note 2, at 218.
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Western Rhodesia under the Barotseland North-Western Rhodesia Order
in Council of 1899.27 The North-Eastern Rhodesia Constabulary was also
subject to article 20 of the Northeastern Rhodesia Order in Council No.
1 of 1911.28 North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia were administra-
tively fused in 1911 under an Order in Council of that year issued to
create Northern Rhodesia.2 9 The unity of these territories precipitated
Northern Rhodesia Proclamation, No. 17 of 1912 to raise a Civil Police
Force, better known as the Northern Rhodesia Police Force.30 Initially, it
comprised 19 British officers, 8 non-commissioned British officers and
740 enlisted Africans. Company rule lasted in Northern Rhodesia from
1899 to 1924, giving way to direct British control in 1924 under the
Northern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1924.31 To reflect requirements
of the new regime, consolidating legislation was promulgated, contained
in the Northern Rhodesia Police Ordinance, No. 16 of 1926.32 The Force
under the law of 1926 functioned also as a military force during wartime
and other emergencies. In 1932, effective 1933, the military portion of
the Force was detached to form the Northern Rhodesia Regiment.
In 1937, a new Northern Rhodesia Police Ordinance, No. 25 of 1937,11
replaced the Law of 1926. A Federation uniting Northern Rhodesia
(Zambia) with Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi),
known as the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, subsisted in the
country between 1953 and 1963.14 To cater to exigencies of law and order
of a federal character in Northern Rhodesia, the Police Ordinance No. 5
of 1953 provided the basis of police administration. 5 As in Nigeria, Local
or Native Authority Police also formed part of the law enforcement
system in Northern Rhodesia during the colonial era. Such local authority
police forces, largely unarmed operated predominantly in rural areas as
messengers enforcing Native Authority edicts and summons. At independ-
ence in 1964, the Northern Rhodesia Police became the Zambia Police
27. The State Law of Northern Rhodesia 1889-1901, at 7.
28. The Statute Law of North-Eastern Rhodesia 253 (1917).
29. No. 438, Statutory Rules and Orders, 85 (1911); see also Influence of Constitutions, supra
note 3.
30. The Statute Law of North-Eastern Rhodesia 253 (1917).
31. No. 324, Statutory Rules and Orders 395 (1924). See also Police in Zambia, supra note 2,
at 219, and Influence of Constitutions, supra note 3.
32. Ordinances, proclamations and orders in council of Northern Rhodesia 35 (1927).
33. 1 Supp. to the Laws of Northern Rhodesia 126 (1946).
34. Influence of Constitutions, supra note 3.
35. 2 Laws of Northern Rhodesia, ch. 44 (1965 ed); see also Police in Zambia, supra note 2,
at 220.
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Force under the same law of 1953 with an estimated force of 6,000
police.36 Colonial regimes were swept away in 1965 by the Police Act,
No. 43 of 1965. 37 This law forms the basis of police operations, organi-
zation and administration in support of the constitutional mechanism on
police.
In 1973, Zambia entered one party rule under a single-party Consti-
tution of the same year. 3 Articles 130 to 134 established a Police and
Prison Service Commission sharing executive powers of police with the
President. The President is overall commander of the Armed Forces with
appointing authority to designate the Inspector-General of Police, Com-
missioner of Police and also members of the Commission. The Commis-
sion, however, appoints, removes and disciplines police officers other than
the two most senior officers noted above.
By and large, organization and administration of the Zambia Police
Force is based on the Police Act of 1965. Its command structure, as in
Nigeria, is hierarchical. Structural patterns of the Force are held together
by three main departments, namely, Administration, Technical and Op-
erations.
In 1985, the Zambia Police Force (Amendment) Act, No. 23 of 198519
introduced another change in the organization and administration of the
Zambia Police Force, at least on paper, by establishing and constituting
a Vigilante Force to support police in their law enforcement functions in
the wake of rising criminality in the country. In practice, however, they
have not been established due to the lack of proper training facilities,
standardized guidelines of recruitment and insufficient funds. As many as
30,000 untrained vigilantes are estimated to roam the country desperately
searching for viable means of support. They may have succumbed to
antisocial conduct in contrast to the formal anticipation of their being
constituted as crime-fighting instruments of state. However, vigilantism
in whatever form indicates the failure of normal policing instruments of
state effectively to maintain law and order. Even though the Zambian
36. Police in Zambia, supra note 2, at 220.
37. Rep. of Zambia Gov't Gazette 273-309 (Acts Supp. 1965) consolidated in 3 Laws of the
Rep. of Zambia, ch. 133 (rev. ed. 1972).
38. Act No. 27, Rep. of Zambia Gov't Gazette 199-201 (Acts Supp. 1973). The Constitution
itself is scheduled to the Act effected through Amendments to the Constitution of 1964 such as
Amendment No. 5. Act 29, Rep. of Zambia Gov't Gazette, 179-182 (Acts Supp. 1972).
39. Rep. of Zambia Gov't Gazette 101 (Acts Supp. 1985). The Zambia Police Bigilantes
Regulations (S.I. No. 122 of 1986) were issued to implement the idea of a vigilante force. Rep. of
Zambia Gov't Gazette 323-334 (S.I. Supp. 1986).
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law of 1985 accords legislative recognition to vigilante forces, their op-
eration must be subjected to the highest standard of constitutional au-
thority of police. This high degree is necessary to ensure their legitimacy
under norms and orders of the Constitution to bring them in line with
the standard required for regular law enforcement agents. Vigilantes are
intended to support an overwhelmed, understaffed and ill-equipped police
force of 12,000 in regular service to cater to an estimated population of
7 million people.40 Other law enforcement agents also support police in
their functions of maintenance of law and order including the Zambia
National Defence Forces, the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Special
Investigation Team for Economy and Trade (SITET), Flying Anti-Robbery
and Anti-Drug Squads, the Office of the President, Zambia Police Reserve,
Mine Police and private security operations. Similar support is no doubt
provided to the Nigeria Police Force.
A comparative emanation of structural organization of police in
Nigeria and Zambia reveals contrasts traced in both cases to the colonial
evolution of the two countries and also their contemporary state functions
influenced by preceding colonial structures. Thus, patterns of policing are
by and large determined by the nature of society created by constitutional
mechanisms. In the case of Nigeria, for example, the federal characteristics
of the country as pronounced mainly from 1954 to the present reflects
the structural patterns of police under the Police Ordinance of 1942.
Though essentially hierarchical, Nigeria police organization and adminis-
tration also reveal a lateral or parallel development corresponding to the
territorial configuration of the country subdivided into 21 states.
In Zambia, the single formation of the national state necessarily
determines its command structure and organization as strictly hierarchical
with functional subdivisions. The nature of the one party form of gov-
ernment since 1973 also enhances this organizational structure of police.
Similarities are discernible in the structural patterns of police forces in
Nigeria and Zambia. First, the two systems of police are unitary forces
to the exclusion of all other police forces such as native or local police
forces as required by their constitutions. However, support forces are
particularly indicated in Zambia. Second, these arrangements are substan-
tially hierarchical, vesting direction and control of the Forces in the
President or Head of State as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.
Third, the Forces also reflect functional accountability as well as geo-
40. Daily Reports: Sub-Saharan Africa 29-31 (Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS),
Tuesday, May 1989).
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graphical. Should the goal of 200,000 police be reached in Nigeria, the
police-public ratio of 1:500 people per police officer will surpass Zambia's
ratio of 1:800 reported in May of 1989 .4
C. State Security Forces
In Nigeria, the premier state security agency appears to be the Nigerian
Security Organization established by Decree, No. 16 of 1976.42 The ubiq-
uitous nature of the this promulgation is reflected in section 2(1), man-
dating that the Nigerian Security Organization prevent and detect any
criminal act involving or relating to national security. It supersedes any
other legislative measure on the same subject. Rule-making powers are
vested in the Head of State to promulgate measures for structural organ-
ization and general administration of the agency. However, the effect of
sub-section (2) of section 3 is that any instrument issued under principal
section 3(1) has equal force of law as a principal law notwithstanding its
attributes as a subordinate law. It is conceivable under this authority for
adjective legislative measures to be more overreaching than the parenting
instrument, from which it derives its legitimacy, because under sub-section
(2), such ancillary legislation is not required to be gazetted for public
scrutiny. This promulgation is of similar import to the Zambian Regula-
tions under the Preservation of Public Security Act, 1960, issued in 1964.' 3
A parallel statute in Nigeria enhancing the extensive discretion of the
executive branch of government in these matters is the State Security
(Detention of Persons) Decree, No. 2 of 1984." The Nigerian Security
Organization was secretly organized subsequent to the assassination of
then Head of State, Murtalla Muhammad. Its composition is not revealed
in the constitutive promulgation, rendering discussion of its internal struc-
ture and organization largely speculative. It was established to provide
supporting intelligence services to the government and has since moved
from purely military functions to a key executive organ informing the
President of conspiracies and plots to overthrow the government, among
its numerous functions. It is reputed to comprise mainly intelligence
41. Id.
42. Ann. Vol. L.N. A71 (1976).
43. 2 Laws of the Rep. of Zambia, ch. 106 (rev. ed. 1972). The principal Act contains six
sections, primarily vesting unlimited discretion and rule-making powers in the President to "legislate"
for purposes of preservation of public security. Regulations issued under these few sections outlined
in 47 sections contain extensive powers of police and state security forces including powers of
detention.
44. Fed. Rep. of Nig. Off. Gazette, A27 (1984).
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officers.4 1 It operates autonomously, though under Presidential control.
The Head of the Nigerian Security Organization sits on the National
Defence and Security Council. The Nigerian Security Organization must
be distinguished from other military intelligence agencies, for example the
Directorate of Military Intelligence and the Defence Intelligence Agency
(DIA). 46 Its functions and relationship with the Nigeria Police Force are
not cordial. 47
On the other hand, the Zambia Security and Intelligence Service (ZSIS)
was established by Act, No. 43 of 1973 of similar designation.4 8 Unlike,
the shroud of mystery surrounding the composition of the Nigeria Security
Organization, ZSIS is comprised of a Director-General, other directors
and officers as the President determines under section 3 of the Act. This
formulation does not nonetheless diminish the secret nature of the Zambia
Security and Intelligence Service. As in Nigeria, ZSIS is also subject to
legislation protecting official secrets. Its functions inter alia cover collec-
tion, gathering, correlating and evaluation of intelligence activities and
other information relevant to the security interests of Zambia. It also
advises and disseminates such intelligence and other national security
information to the government, its departments, institutions and other
designated corporations and organizations. It is responsible for intelligence
and security of vital installations and classified information, as required
by the State Security Act of 1969. 49 It also supervises and coordinates all
activities and information of any ministry, government departments, the
armed forces and police to the extent their operations and activities relate
to security and intelligence. Under the law of 1973, an intelligence officer
for purposes of powers contained in the Preservation of Public Security
Act, 1960 as amended and Regulations of 19640 as well as the State
Security Act is a police officer with powers of detention. Officers in the
Service are armed persons permitted to shoot when necessary. Rule-making
powers, as in the Nigerian case, are vested in the President. A Staff Board
subject to directions of the Director-General selects, appoints, promotes
and disciplines officers below the rank of Director. The Board also advises
the Director-General on incidental matters affecting the general welfare
45. PERTH CORP., NIGERIA'S NEW GOVERNMENT 16 (Defence and Foreign Affairs Publications,
1985).
46. Id.
47. NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 275 (Harold D. Nelson ed., 4th ed. 1982).
48. Rep. of Zambia Gov't Gazette 369 (Acts Supp. 1973).
49. 2 The Laws of the Rep. of Zambia, ch. 110 (rev. ed. 1972).
50. Id. ch. 106.
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and efficiency of the Service. As noted above, other special law enforce-
ment agents also operate in the country akin to modalities of the Zambia
Security and Intelligence Service. These include the Special Investigation
Team for Economy and Trade (SITET), police and state security agents
accredited to the Office of the President, specialized units of the National
Defence Forces and the Anti-Corruption Commission.
Both the Nigerian and Zambian security forces enjoy extraordinary
powers of detention. In Nigeria, this is contained in Decree No. 2 of
1984,1' and in Zambia, in the Preservation of Public Security Act and
Regulations. They both function in secret, pursuant to legislative mandate.
They have been known to impact the security of fundamental human
rights negatively, especially in matters affecting national security.52
D. The Relationship Between Police and State Security Forces to
Political Elites and Other Dominant Classes
The affinity of police and state security forces to political elites and
other dominant classes is by and large determined by their functions as
instruments of power in the state." In Nigeria, ethnicity plays a significant
role in masking elite struggles for power and social stratification.5 4 Carter
and Marenin have established a link between police action, performance
of a government and public perception of both police and government."
Police action is perceived as an extension of exercise of governmental
power. Therefore, police are deemed an integral component of government
and administration reflecting the influence of political and dominant
classes especially in the executive branch of government. No other agency
of government appears to impact efficacious constitutionalism of a state
more than police. Carter and Marenin also have postulated that inasmuch
as courts of law are among the most important instruments of government
frequently in contact with people in the state, it is arguable that in terms
of impact on the community, the police are a very visible force, especially
in the developing countries. Because of this presence in the lives of people,
51. Fed. Rep. of Nig. Off. Gazette, A27 (1984).
52. See infra, section III, comparative analysis of human rights in Nigeria and Zambia.
53. Police in Nigeria, supra note 2.
54. Fed. Rep. of Nig. Rep. of the Pol. Bureau 14 (Mar. 1987).
55. Marshall Carter & Otwin Marenin, The Political Role of the Police and the Nigerian Draft
Constitution, 1 Nia. BEHAV. SCI. J. 93-103 (1978); see also their Human Rights in the Nigerian
Context: A Case Study and Discussion of the Nigeria Police Force, I UNIVERSAL HUM. RTs. 43-61
(1979); and their Law Enforcement and Political Change in Post Civil War Nigeria, 9 J. CluM. JUST.
125-149 (1981).
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the police clearly influence the course of constitutional function in the
state.5
6
This postulation is equally applicable to Nigeria and Zambia police
forces, as it is pertinent to other policing arrangements in Sub-Saharan
African or indeed any other state. Therefore, a nexus is envisioned between
police, state security forces and performance of a government. These
regimes necessarily entail legitimacy and accountability of a government.5 7
Police in Nigeria and Zambia, as in other countries of Sub-Saharan
Africa are generally criticized for abuse of their powers, misconduct,
corrupt practices and other actions of anti-social behavior. 8 These factors
negatively impact the preservation and security of fundamental human
rights in certain cases. Tensions are also prevalent between police, state
security forces and students, culminating in unwarranted closures of
universities in both countries.59 These confrontations are fueled by the
nature of subsisting political systems, inherently preemptive of active
student participation in the political process. We advocate liberalization
of the political process in all of Sub-Saharan Africa, to facilitate this
student interaction in the affairs of state. Ironically, however, both sides
to this conflict can ill-afford sustained tensions between the two groups,
as each is uniquely required for the efficacious development of their
nations. It is the belief here that liberalization of the political process will
necessarily coincide with decreases in student and police conflicts.
The issue of corruption in the public sector generally and in the police
force in particular is common to both Nigeria and Zambia. The two
countries also share similar problems in criminal misconduct of sitting
56. Human Rights in the Nigerian Context: A Case Study and Discussion of the Nigeria Police
Force, supra note 55.
57. Otwin Marenin, Policing African States: Toward a Critique, 14 Comts. POL. 379-396 (July
1982).
58. Igbinovia, Police in Trouble: Administrative and Organizational Problems of the Nigeria
Police Force, 28 INDIAN J. Pi-m. ADmN. 334-372 (1982) [hereinafter Police in Trouble].
59. Police in Nigeria, supra note 2.
The Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa (FBIS) of Monday January 8, 1990, at 13 reports that
the Nigerian Military Government has promulgated Decree No. 47 to deter violent demonstrations
and protests. Under this Law, any student found guilty of participating in a demonstration is subject
to imprisonment for five. years, fined 50000 Naira or both. The Decree is reportedly also applicable
to anyone convicted of organizing student protests. Any such student is triable by a special tribunal.
The Decree also empowers heads of universities and colleges to terminate or dissolve any student
union deemed in conflict with interests of national security, public safety, or his representative can
also expel or suspend any student of a dissolved union. Anyone so punished can only appeal to the
President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The new law also emphasized the proscription of the
National Association of Nigerian Students.
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police officers, contributing negatively to the public image of police. 60 In
both cases, police also may function as state security forces. 6'
In Zambia, state security forces are by legislative mandate empowered
to exercise powers of detention as police in similar manner as are the
Nigeria state security forces under the provisions of Decree, No. 2 of
1984. In both cases, therefore, they also execute functions akin to the
external defence of the country. Similarly, undue emphasis on internal
security and other public order functions neglects other police duties of
a purely law enforcement nature, both juridical and symbolic. In the two
countries, the importance of an impartial process of law enforcement is
demanded more so by the nature of prevailing political systems, namely
one party rule in Zambia and military rule in Nigeria. In Zambia, extensive
powers of police concerning detention of persons, buttressed by a contin-
uous state of emergency since just before independence, are identical to
those exercised by the Nigerian state security forces under decree No. 2
of 1984, noted above. In both Nigeria and Zambia, their exercise has led
to abuse of basic rights in documented cases. 62 In the two countries,
regime protection of the government in power permeates police and state
security functions to the detriment of ordinary and equitable maintenance
of law and order in the national states. In both Nigeria and Zambia, the
overwhelming or expunging of democratic institutions supports this thesis
of regime protection. These reflect unwarranted intrusion into the law
enforcement function of police by the political and other dominant classes.
In Zambia, the role of the President in appointing members of the
Police and Prison Service Commission, the Inspector-General of Police
and Commissioner of Police, within the purview of structural patterns of
one party system of government assures party control of police outside
the ambit of purely civil service characteristics. This position is contrasted
with that in Nigeria in which the military government ensures effective
control of police signified by the abolition of functions of the Nigeria
Police Service Commission and their integration into the Nigeria Police
Council. Nigeria's attempts at constitutional insulation of police from
influence of political and dominant classes have been thwarted over the
years. 63 This state of affairs negatively impacts on the peaceful enjoyment
60. Police in Zambia, supra note 2, at 223; see also Marshall Carter & Otwin Marenin, Police
in the community: Perceptions of a Government Agency in Action in Nigeria, 15 AFR. L. STUD. 9-
28 (1977).
61. Police in Zambia, supra note 2, at 223.
62. Id.
63. Police in Nigeria, supra note 2.
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of fundamental human rights of the individual. Insofar as the use of
police and state security forces for political gain spells corruption of both
police and the state at large," correspondingly, it also must reflect a crisis
of confidence in law enforcement agents and the state as sanctioned
custodians of governmental power. This negative perception necessarily
leads to public disaffection and a heightened scrutiny of the authority
and legitimacy to govern. In practice, this proposition is supported by
recent uprisings in Eastern Europe, especially Romania and East Germany,
where excessive recourse to state security forces as a coercive tool of
government itself provided the basis of these revolutions. Since the man-
date of police is intertwined with government and administration, its
preemption signifies revocation of authority to rule. Therefore, unsanc-
tioned actions by authority of the people delegated to the government,
police and state security forces prima facie undermine governmental
authority to exercise reasonable control over persons and property. In
such a case, they must be reformed to comply with their mandate or risk
its withdrawal.
II. Responsibility of Nigerian and Zambian Police and State Security
Forces in Law and Practice
In both Nigeria and Zambia, as in other countries of Commonwealth
Africa, the responsibility or accountability of police and state security
forces is constitutional in nature.65 Constitutional underpinnings of this
accountability evolve into second-tier norms of constitutional law per se:
involving torts, administrative law, criminal law and criminal procedure,
evidence and other branches of law, to the extent that law enforcement
action is subject to reasonable control for the common good and not for
the protection of the regime in power. As such, unreasonable measures
of control impinge on individual rights. Since fundamental human rights
constitute organic norms of the Constitution, all other norms, whether
issued in the Constitution or under it, must be conscionable under the
spirit of fundamental human rights provisions. Therefore, the primary
test must be constitutional in nature, to ascribe legality and liability of
police and state security forces. This view is supported by the Nigerian
case of Olushola Oygbemi v. Attorney General of Lagos.66 It is declared
that if the courts of law find that the powers of the police have been
64. See, e.g., Corrupt Practices Act, 1980, Zambia Statute, Rep. of Zambia Gov't Gazette 63
(Acts Supp. 1980); see also Police in Nigeria, supra note 2.
65. Police in Zambia, supra note 2, at 224.
66. 3 N.C.L.R. 895 (1982).
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exercised outside constitutional boundaries, advertently or inadvertently,
in any way which vitiates fundamental human rights provisions of the
Constitution, or that any such powers of the police are at variance with
a statute or any law which controls a particular subject, Nigerian courts
will declare such actions unconstitutional and illegal. The courts provide
the necessary buffer between the inhabitants of society on one hand and
the executive through the police on the other, to ensure that their actions
strictly comply with the Constitution of Nigeria.67
In both Nigeria and Zambia, as in predominantly all of Sub-Saharan
Africa, the bulk of police and public encounters requiring immediate
constitutional accountability is in the sphere of fundamental human rights
themselves. Court resolution of these interactions invariably rotate on
whether police or state security forces have in any way infringed funda-
mental human rights of the individual.68
The primary function of police to maintain law and order for the
peaceful and unbridled enjoyment of fundamental human rights must be
conciliated against their mandate of reasonable control as instruments of
power in the state. Congenial balance of rights enjoyment and exercise
of powers of police is in the case of Nigeria governed by article 41 of
the Constitution of 1979,69 while in Zambia the applicable provision is
article 26 of the Constitution of 1973.70 Article 41 of the Constitution of
Nigeria stipulates that, notwithstanding sections 34-38 of the Constitution,
the Constitution cannot invalidate any law reasonably justified in the
interests of defense, public order, public safety, public morality or public
health or to protect the rights and freedoms of other persons.
Under this article, the tranquility of enjoyment of rights is subject to
the powers of the police and state security forces. Article 26 of the
Constitution of Zambia in practice has the effect of article 41 of the
Constitution of Nigeria and the Nigerian State Security (Detention of
Persons) Decree No. 2, 1984 combined. 7' Article 26 of the Constitution
of Zambia deals with both matters of detention and national public
emergencies introduced in the country since just before independence.
67. Id. at 912.
68. See generally Prophet Malim-Jola v. Commissioner of Police, I All N.L.R. 31; see also
Re-Thomas Cain, 1974 Z.L.R. 71; and Charles Mwalimu, Integrative Approaches to Constitutionalism
in the Zambian One Party State: Theoretical and Practical Utilitarianism of Legal Orders (forthcoming).
69. Supra note 20.
70. Supra note 38.
71. Supra note 44.
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This state of affairs has continued until today. This article requires that
despite the provisions of fundamental human rights in articles 15, 18, 19,
22-25, nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law can
be held inconsistent with these enumerated provisions, if it is adduced
that this law permits authorities in Zambia during an emergency or war
to deal with these factors. However, these measures of the government
must be reasonable, taking into account the surrounding circumstances at
the time.
A declaration of emergency is pronounced under authority of article
30 of the Constitution. Under this article, the President has power at any
time, by proclamation published in the Gazette,72 to declare, first, that a
state of public emergency exists, or, second, that a situation exists which,
if it is permitted to continue, may develop into a state of public emergency.
This executive power of the President is a legacy of colonial rule similarly
invested in the colonial governor to deal with disturbances, mostly those
associated with the liberation struggle for national independence.
When the President exercises his power to declare a public emergency,
his act gives rise to the regime of the Emergency Powers Act, 1964. 71 If
the second attribute of article 30(1) of the Constitution is utilized, it
denotes exercise of presidential powers of detention conferred on him and
police under the Preservation of Public Security Act, 1960 and Regulations
of 1964. 74 The legislative history of these two enactments is like the
parenting article 30 of the Constitution traced to periods immediately
before independence. The atmosphere and process of emergency or semi-
state of emergency, introduced by the colonial governor, have by law and
practice been operational in the country since just before independence
and is continuing. 7 Under these legislative measures, the President, police
and state security forces enjoy extraordinary powers including detention
of persons held in certain cases to suppress basic and guaranteed rights
of freedom of movement. Regulations 33(1) and (6) of the Preservation
of Public Security Regulations emphasize the broad powers of detention
by the President, police and state security forces. These jointly require
that whenever the President is of the view that, in order to preserve public
security in Zambia, it is pertinent to control any person, he is at liberty
to order that such a person be detained. Following this order, the person
can be arrested.
72. The Gazette is the primary medium of promulgation and publication of newly-enacted laws
and amendments to any such laws.
73. 2 Laws of the Republic of Zambia, ch. 108 (rev. ed. 1972).
74. Id. ch. 106.
75. Police in Nigeria, supra note 2.
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Furthermore, any Assistant Inspector of Police, or a person of higher
rank (or an equivalent counterpart in the public security system of Zambia)
may, without warrant, arrest any person if he believes that grounds exist
which would justify detaining him under these Regulations. Thereafter,
he may order the detention of the person for a maximum of twenty-eight
days while a decision is pending from the President whether to bring a
formal detention order against the person. However, due to the fact that
the spirit of constitutionalism must regulate not only the prescription and
exercise of presidential, police and state security powers, notwithstanding
the draconian nature of emergency legislation, but also their accountabil-
ity, a process must be created to conciliate individual and class interaction
with state instrumentalities of power for review of executive action in-
volving police powers.
Harmony between the two sets of values, namely, rights enjoyment
on one hand and state rights and interests embodied in emergency legis-
lation as the basis of detention powers of the President and police on the
other, is provided by article 27 of the Constitution which states that if a
person's freedom of movement is constrained or if he is detained under
any law referred to in articles 24 and 26 of the Constitution, then such
detention triggers a number of constitutional processes. First, the person
must, as soon as is reasonably practicable, up to a maximum of fourteen
days since the detention began, be supplied with a written statement in a
language which he understands, explaining in great detail, the reasons and
other grounds which merit his detention. Second, before a month lapses
from the time his detention started, a notice should be published in the
Gazette stating that the person has been detained. This notice should also
state the legal provisions which authorize the detention. Finally, upon
request of the detainee, at any point during the course of the detention
but not earlier than one year from the start of his detention or since a
similar request was made, his case must be reviewed by an independent
and impartial tribunal constituted under a law. As of right, a detained
person must have access to legal representation in court and the inde-
pendent tribunal reviewing his case.
A regime of case law has emerged under these provisions to challenge
the liberal exercise of Presidential and police powers of detention, argu-
ments primarily founded on constitutional accountability but giving rise
to such tort actions as false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. In
Joyce Banda v. Attorney General,76 for example, petitioner, a suspect in
76. 1978 Z.L.R. 233.
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a murder trial, was detained under police powers conferred by Regulation
33(6) of the Preservation of Public Security Regulations for nine days
and then released without providing grounds of detention as required by
article 27 of the Constitution. She successfully maintained an action against
the state for false imprisonment. The Court criticized abuse of police
powers under Regulation 33(6), stating that under this Regulation, a
person can be arrested and detained only if the police officer is of the
view that grounds exist which would render a detention order by the
President not only probable, but justifiable as well as in keeping with
Regulation 33(1). But it is illegal to use Regulation 33(6) in order to
investigate a criminal offense which is not related to the public security.
It is not right to put forward a proposition that in regard to detention
under Regulation 33(6), the police should act on suspicion without exis-
tence of grounds of detention as required by article 27 of the Constitution.
Therefore, this Regulation as any other containing powers of detention
can only be used where grounds of detention are established. If this
interpretation of Regulation 33(6) is not meritorious, then it would be
considered ultra vires the Constitution. 77
In Mulwanda v. The People,78 Mulwanda, a Permanent Secretary in
the Ministry of Home Affairs, was detained by police under same Reg-
ulation 33(6) for corrupt practices. The police officer who had effected
the detention was of the view that this was a peculiar case which required
similar unusual methods of investigation. The officer, therefore, decided
to detain him and other persons without trial. The officer further adduced
in evidence that had he not used his powers of detention, the truth
regarding corruption in the Ministry of Home Affairs would not have
been properly ascertained. The High Court of Zambia disagreed with his
use of detention powers under this Regulation, warning that this attitude
of the police officer was not only reprehensible but also dangerous. This
is because, not only will law-abiding citizens of the Republic be incensed
at flagrant abuse of office and corruption by those in power, it is also
unpalatable that law enforcement agents advertently use illegal means of
arrest. By their illegal methods, they simply substitute one type of unac-
ceptable behavior with another, compounding the abuse of power by the
executive branch. The police in essence negate the ideal of an orderly
77. Id. at 234.
78. 1976 Z.L.R. 133.
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society which they set out to protect in the first place. Police sojourns
into illegal activities spell the disintegration of society. 79
In Nigeria, the exercise of police or state security powers under article
41 of the Constitution is not unfettered vis-a-vis fundamental human
rights provisions outlined in Chapter IV, articles 30-42 of this instrument.
For example, under article 32(2) of the Constitution securing personal
liberty, law enforcement agents must strictly comply with a set of rules
and procedures. First, they must inform the person arrested or detained
of rights to maintain silence or refuse to provide unsolicited information
which can incriminate the person. Access to an attorney before providing
information is a constitutional right of the accused, arrested or detained.
Second, a person arrested or in police custody must be informed in
writing, in a language understandable by him, of the facts and grounds
of detention. These must be provided within twenty-four hours of arrest
or detention. Third, if arrest or detention are executed under article 32(1)
of the Constitution, in order to secure attendance of the person before a
court of law pursuant to a court order or based on reasonable suspicion
of this person's having committed an offense, and detention is ordered
in order to avert commission of a criminal offense, then such a person
shall promptly be brought before a court of law within a reasonable time.
If proceedings in a court and charges against him are not preferred or
brought to trial for two months from the date of arrest or detention,
then such a person must be released unconditionally or conditionally on
reasonable grounds. The conditions must relate only to securing appear-
ance before a court of law. Reasonable conditions were defined in the
Constitution.
Finally, compensation was payable under sub-section (6) of section 32
of the Constitution, accompanied by a public apology from detaining
authorities, for unlawful arrest or detention. In any case, wrongful arrest
and detention constituted incidents of civil actions in tort for false
imprisonment and malicious prosecution. These constitutional provisions
are no longer operational. They were revoked by Decrees 1 and 2 of 1984
discussed above. Needless to note that, in the absence of constitutional
protection then offered by fundamental human rights provisions, it is not
hard to imagine an environment in which abuse of rights could occur. In
any case, absence of the security of law is in itself a negation of basic
rights.
Section 4 of Decree No. 2, 1984 stipulates that no legal action can lie
against anyone in military government for any act done or omitted to be
79. Id. at 136.
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done under this Decree. Accordingly, provisions on fundamental human
rights of the Constitution are suspended for purposes of interpretation
and administration of Decree No. 2 of 1984. Therefore, under this law,
any question whether any fundamental human rights are vitiated because
of the exercise of powers by the military government under this law cannot
be inquired into by the courts.
During both civilian and military rule under the Constitution of 1979,
however, Nigerian courts, especially the Supreme Court, continue to
uphold the sanctity of cardinal provisions of the Constitution to delineate
permissible intrusions in the arena of fundamental human rights based on
policy considerations of national security, public order, public welfare
and public morality, despite the repeal of these provisions. 0 Courts have
particularly required a higher standard to ensure complete adherence to
the mandate of police sanctioned under the Constitution.8'
Accountability of police under other branches of law such as torts,
criminal, administrative and criminal procedure laws is in large respects
illustrated by case law. In Nigeria, one such case is Obi v. Chukwumah,82
where the plaintiff, following a detention of more than four months,
brought an action for malicious prosecution. In Zambia, Mbandangoma
v. Attorney General,83 Kabika v. The People" and Mushingo v. The
People5 are similar illustrative cases on accountability of police under
branches of law other than constitutional law per se.
Under both the Nigerian and Zambian Constitutions and governing
police and state security legislation, law enforcement agents, as units of
a government and as individuals, are subject to administrative control.
By and large, these measures constitute internal acts of discipline. In
Nigeria, the body previously in control of appointments, transfer, pro-
motion, dismissal and other disciplinary measures of police was the Nigeria
Police Service Commission, established under articles 140, 194 to 196 of
the Constitution of 1979. Its functions as noted above have been taken
80. MURDER OF DELE GIWA: THE RIGHT OF A PRIVATE PROSECUTOR (1988).
81. See, for example, Uzodima v. Commissioner of Police, I N.C.L.R. 325 (1982); Onu-
Obekpa v. Commissioner of Police, 2 N.C.L.R. 240 (1982); Folade v. Attorney General of Lagos
State & Four Others, I N.C.L.R. 270 (1982); see also MURDER OF DELE GIWA, supra note 80.
82. 2 All N.L.R. 69 (1964); see also Chief Oyelakin Balogun v. Alhaju Busari Amubikhan, 3
N.W.L.R. 27 (1985).
83. 1979 Z.L.R. 45.
84. 1979 Z.L.R. 352.
85. 1976 Z.L.R. 214.
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over by the Police Council, reestablished by the Police (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Decree, No. 5 of 1989.86
In Zambia, a similar administrative accountability under the Consti-
tution is ensured by a Police and Prison Service Commission established
in articles 130-134 of the Constitution of 1973. In both countries, admin-
istrative accountability by the Commissions (Nigeria, until the reinvestment
of powers in the Council) is through annual reports to the public through
the President as head of state.8 7 Direct control of police through a Police
Council in Nigeria, comprising the President as Commander in Chief of
the Armed Forces, the Chief of General Staff, the Minister of Internal
Affairs, and the Inspector-General of Police removes the civil service
attributes of the Commission to reestablish the Council not only as part
of military chain of command, but also infuses direct political interference
in the affairs of police. Under this system, the issue is not so much
accountability of police to an independent body within the executive
branch of government, as direct administration and management of police
in similar manner as the army, air force or other branches of the armed
forces. Control is superseded by accountability.
In Zambia, exercise of disciplinary powers by the Zambia Police and
Prison Service Commission led to the dismissal of 63 police officers and
two demotions in 1979, 40 dismissals in 1980, 31 in 1981 and one demotion
and 37 dismissals in 1982 with one discharge.
The new composition of the Nigeria Police Council combines policy
formulation, administration and disciplinary control reposed in this body.
Consistent with legislative policy, the hierarchical arrangement of the
Force underwrites individual police accountability from least in rank up
to the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. This is a
feature common to both Nigeria and Zambia as in other countries of
Sub-Saharan Africa. Administrative accountability is well documented
under the Zambian system more than is the case in Nigeria.
We have acknowledged that the power of police to discharge their
functions effectively under law requires discretion vested in them as
individuals and as a units of government."8 But these powers must always
satisfy the requirements of guarantee and security of fundamental human
86. FED. REP. OF NIG. OFiIici. GAZETTE, A39 (Feb. 8, 1989).
87. ZAMBIA POLICE ANN. REP. for the years 1974, 1976, 1980 and 1981 (1965 -) and POLICE
AND PRISON SERVICE COMMISSION ANN. REP. for the Years 1979-1982 (1980 -); see also ANN. REP.
OF THE NIGERIA POLICE FORCE 1926-1979.
88. Police in Nigeria, supra note 2.
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rights of the individual. This is the responsibility or accountability of
police as a unit of government and as individuals.
III. Comparative Human Rights Practices in Nigeria and Zambia and
The Influence of Police and State Security Forces 1979-1980; 1982-1985
AND 198789
A. History, Development and Current Administration
In both Nigeria and Zambia, as in other countries of Sub-Saharan
Africa, formulation of fundamental human rights only formed part of
constitutional mechanisms of these countries at independence. No instru-
ment of constitutional orders in Nigeria from 1861 to 1954 and Zambia
from 1889 to 1963 contained provisions of fundamental human rights as
such. We have argued that this fundamental omission inherently contrib-
uted to the demise of the colonial society. 90 At independence however,
prescription of basic rights of the individual, howbeit restricted, symbol-
ized a new era in cognitive preservation of guaranteed human rights in
Sub-Saharan Africa.
In the case of Nigeria, judicial notice must be taken of the fact that
provisions on fundamental human rights then contained in Part IV of the
Constitution of 1979 have at the time of writing continued to be abrogated
by Decrees 1 and 2 of 1984. Despite their revocation, however, their
contextual tenor and formulation are similar to those prescribed under
the Constitution of Zambia. Therefore, highlight of fundamental human
rights provisions in Zambia generally suffices to cover similar operational
rights in Nigeria between 1979 to 1983. Both Nigeria and Zambia have
been instrumental in formulating the Charter of Human and Peoples
Rights adopted by the Heads of State of the Organization of African
Unity (O.A.U.) on June 27, 1981, at Nairobi, Kenya. 9'
Articles 13 to 26 of the Zambian Constitution and 30-42 of the
Constitution of Nigeria, 1979 secure basic rights and freedoms to life,
liberty, dignity of the human person, privacy of the home and family
life, freedom of expression and the press, peaceful assembly and associ-
ation, freedom of movement, freedom from discrimination on grounds
of race, affinity, gender, ethnicity, etc. and restrictions on compulsory
89. Based on UNITED STATES, DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES,
for the years discussed.
90. Police in Zambia, supra note 2.
91. 91 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 58 (1982).
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acquisition of private property. Where expropriation occurs, on grounds
of eminent domain, compensation must be fair,, equitable and promptly
paid as reflected in article 40 of the Constitution of Nigeria. The peculiar
feature of human rights provisions in Sub-Saharan Africa including Nigeria
and Zambia is that complete enjoyment of fundamental human rights is
either preempted or limited by specific restrictions also contained in the
same provisions which secure guaranteed rights. These derogations to
fundamental human rights are justified in the Constitutions based on
national security, public order, public morality or for purposes of pro-
tecting the rights, interests and reputations of others. In Zambia, espe-
cially, fundamental human rights could be abridged at any time under
article 26 of the Constitution, while similar provisions are also found in
article 41 of the Constitution of Nigeria, 1979. In such cases, the victim
of abuse must show that the laws or actions which vitiate his rights are
not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society according to the Zambian
Constitution. In Nigeria, reasonable justification to expunge rights only
pertain to national emergencies. Under article 41 of the Nigerian Consti-
tution, however, no measure instituted in such extraordinary circumstances
of public emergency (except death in consequence of war) can deviate
from the guarantee of rights to life and fair hearing.
Zambia has combined as well as deviated from the Nigerian method.
Because the country has functioned under a state of emergency or semi-
state of emergency since just before independence, the President enjoys
overreaching powers to suspend the whole realm of human rights at any
time. Once they are jettisoned, the onus is on the victim to show in a
court of law that the action or law upon which such governmental action
is predicated through police or state security forces were not reasonably
justifiable in a democratic society. This is a heavier burden of proof than
ordinarily required by normative rules of evidence.
B. New Horizons of Human Rights Law in Nigeria and Zambia
We have opposed encroachment on fundamental human rights in both
Nigeria and Zambia when based on goals of public domain. We have
suggested instead complete and unbridled enjoyment of basic rights guar-
anteed under these Constitutions, except where they interfere with the
rights of others including residual rights and interests of state. 92 In the
case of rights and interests of states, however, these must be constrained
92. Police in Zambia, supra note 2, at 236.
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by the fundamentality of norms of individual human rights upon which
they are founded. As regards the rights of others, a sizeable number of
laws, rules and regulations especially the criminal law (though in need of
reform) are already prevalent to ensure peaceful coexistence of law-abiding
inhabitants of society as well as to secure the interests of state. In any
case, fundamentality of the norms of human rights demands a reappraisal
of prescriptive levels of formulation between guaranteed human rights
and interests of state.
We have proposed that since norms regulating rights and interests of
state are subordinate to and framed on the foundation created by norms
of fundamental human rights, goals of public domain are juridically
incompetent to abridge them. Therefore, considerations of national se-
curity, public order, welfare and others erected on fundamental human
rights to protect the individual are second-tier prescriptive norms tracing
their sanctity from the generality of norms of basic human rights. There-
fore fundamental human rights must be incapable of state proscription
by reference to its own powers, subordinate to the norms of fundamental
human rights. Any restrictions by states to limit or curtail the complete
enjoyment of fundamental human rights decimates the power base upon
which the state is built.
The Constitution signifies an amalgam of diversity and yet is symbolic
of the commonality of human spirit uniquely ascribed and reposed in
each and every individual. This is the foundation of constitutional mech-
anism representative of the collective will of the people. In essence, this
humanity or rights fundamentally inherent in this humanity can not be
diminished in any way.
We concede that wrongdoing must be redressed through state appa-
ratus erected for such purposes. However, formulation and erection of
the institutional edifice are second-tier constructions supporting the amal-
gam of fundamental human rights. Therefore, even though the government
is permitted on this second-tier level to act legally, it can only execute
those functions which by their very fundamental nature are not prohibited.
Since The People have declared that their individual rights are fundamental
as sanctified in the Constitution, the government lacks the requisite
authority to proclaim otherwise. Why? In our view, The People, under
the fundamentality of their rights, create the government and state and
not vice versa. Since the government is an instrument of The People, it
can only carry out those specific functions not prohibited by The People.
It is submitted that The People themselves have prohibited the government,
state, police or state security forces from abridging fundamental human
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1990
rights except to affect such rights in the case of intrusion in other people's
rights or that external threat or perils of tangible national emergencies
are such that these rights must be affected. In the case of national
emergencies, these are by their very nature transient and cannot be deemed
to last more than a fixed term necessary to deal with this emergency. The
continuation of this draconian power by the state is a flaw in Zambian
constitutionalism.
We have argued that fundamental human rights enshrined in the
Constitutions of Nigeria and Zambia are enunciated at levels way beyond
that which it is permissible to restrict or derogate at the whim of the
state. Thus, on this fundamental level no law or action of state can
properly permit extinction of life, torture or other forms of cruel and
unusual punishment or degrading treatment, deprivation of liberty, free-
dom to peaceful assembly and association, etc., as long as they do not
impinge on the rights of others, notwithstanding considerations of national
security, public welfare, public order or other policy justifications. Aqy
such law or action is ultra vires the Constitution.
It is laudable to prescribe the following in the Constitution. First,
that in the case of wrongdoing penalty is justified. Second, that stringent
measures, enforced by a wide range of law enforcement agents, may be
imposed to preserve the sovereignty of the state. Finally, that those
members of that segment of the population whose role it is to preserve
order (i.e. the police and the armed forces) must act only in a lawful,
orderly and prescribed manner themselves.
This articulation is fundamentally at variance with pronouncements
contained in the Constitutions of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, in-
cluding Nigeria and Zambia, that basic or fundamental human rights are
secured while the state reserves itself power to determine when, where
and whether they are indeed secured and protected and finally that they
can be withdrawn at the discretion of political elites and other dominant
classes. This is a negation of the concept of fundamentality, because
human rights of the individual in our view are not discretionary at the
instance of the state. They constitute the cornerstone for the founding of
the state. The latter view signifies illegitimate usurpation of rights of
individuals by a government or state by recourse to an erroneous appli-
cation of state power and authority. In the former case, however, deter-
mination is one of second-tier, namely that under appropriate regimes of
law such as the criminal law and laws applicable to armed forces, police
and security forces, for purposes of preservation of public order and
security (policy of a government), rights are bargainable to the extent that
a wrong has been committed or that fundamental human rights may
legally be affected in the permissible interaction between state and the
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individual such as during a national public emergency. As long as pro-
scription takes place at the fundamental level, the government has no
power to take them away. However, the government, while it cannot
abrogate fundamental human rights, legally can affect their enjoyment,
but only at the level of second tier upon which the state is created, for
example as provided by the criminal law. In other words, both the law
and, action of the government must be consistent to the norms of
fundamental human rights prescribed in the Constitution. If they offend
the sanctity of fundamental human rights, either as contained in the
Constitution or issued under it, they preempt the fundamentality of norms
of human rights. This means that the policy of a government manifested
in any law, or an act of such government based on this law, cannot take
the place of fundamental human rights. Thus, the government cannot
assert that human rights are supplanted because of a law on national
security, public order, welfare, defense or simply because its action based
on any such law is reasonably justified in a democratic society. 93 If that
were permissible, we would risk and permit a totalitarian government
responsive only to itself and not subject to the tenets of human rights
upon which it is created.
On the other hand, the legitimacy of policy considerations to delimit
complete enjoyment of fundamental human rights juridically find expres-
sion in second-tier norms predominantly formulated in the criminal laws
and other measures of public order. These effectuate governmental policy
addressing rights and interests inherent in state sovereignty, such as public
order, treason, sedition, etc. They legitimately derive their authority from
norms of fundamental human rights. However, norms of state sovereignty
are not in our view designed to supersede the superiority of norms of
fundamental human rights as the "mother lode" for the essence and
function of state. Consequently, subjecting fundamental human rights to
second-tier prescriptive norms is to undermine their organic nature as the
most important part of constitutionalism.
An example of the concept of second-tier prescriptive level in the
Constitution upon which rights of state are founded and its interests
realized is the manifestation of the criminal law, especially principles of
capital punishment.Y We note that judicial sanctions to terminate an
93. For details, see id. at 240. This proposition is confined to the functions of government in
its domestic jurisdiction and does not extend to incidents of external aggression.
94. In August of 1988, Staff of the Law Library, Library of Congress, carried out a survey
based on primary and secondary sources on the status of capital punishment around the world. That
study indicates that 28 countries object to the death penalty, 18 others allow it for very exceptional
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offender's life under the authority of laws of capital punishment reflecting
the policy of a government must be distinguished from the fundamentality
of life preserved under the Constitutions of Nigeria and of Zambia. Under
these orders, this guaranteed life is fundamentally protected from state
preemption. We maintain that policy considerations of a government
determine whether capital punishment should be part of the criminal laws.
However, the government is inherently incapable of fairly determining
whether the life of a political activist who has not committed any criminal
offense should be expunged and the circumstances under the Constitution
upon which it is acceptable to terminate his life.
The Library of Congress Law Library study makes a distinction
between political action by the government to suppress political dissent
and bona fide criminal behavior which must be punished. This study
strongly objects to the use of law, especially disguised as criminal law, to
proscribe fundamental human rights of the individual. In this instance,
the law is enacted to protect the subordinate rights of a government by
subjugating the superior norms of fundamental human rights reposed in
each and every individual. It is justifiable to affect this life under a second
tier in the Constitution, upon which state and government are founded
and coordinated. But since this second tier is subordinate to the organic
norm of fundamental human rights on the primary level of constitutional
formulation, this policy of the government can not contradict, diminish
or preempt the organic norm of fundamental human rights from whence
it derives its energy or its operational and functional powers. Therefore,
a second tier norm of state and governmental foundation in the Consti-
tution, policy of the government and law reflecting this policy can only
enhance the fundamentality of the organic norm of human rights for it
legitimately to affect rights of individuals. Any other pronouncement to
the contrary negates the basis upon which second tier norms of society
are founded, namely human rights of the individual.
In our view, fundamental human rights signify the embodiment of the
totality of humanity uniquely reposed in each and every individual, and
yet common to all. It is this commonality as the essence of life represented
in the Collective Will of the People that is manifested in the Constitution.
It must be immune from torture, detention, inhuman treatment, forced
criminal activities and 128 others, including Nigeria and Zambia, impose this form of punishment
for ordinary and exceptional crimes. For details, see LAW LIBRARY, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FOREIGN
LAW SURVEYS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (Aug. 1988).
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labor or any other nocuous use of state powers. It must be free, unless
in some way, it offends similar fundamental norm of human rights. In
such a case, it enters the arena of second tier in which the State is
predominate under the law of the land conscionable to the fundamentality
of human rights.
Therefore, any enunciation and enshrinement by the State to justify
preemption of fundamental human rights in specific instances by erroneous
reference to the superiority of state sovereignty over fundamental human
rights of the individual erodes their inherent sanctity and fundamentality.
A formulation that they are repealable at the discretion of the state
necessarily admits that death, torture and other forms of inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment are conscionable in these state-justified
circumstances.
This proposition in our view is not only dangerously misguided, but
also erroneous, morally corrupt and constitutionally unsound. It is the
exact opposite from that which must be deemed meritorious, namely
enunciation, declaration and enshrinement of the fundamentality of human
rights in the most organic of all instruments, custom or practice in the
state representing the collective will of the people. These pillars of gov-
ernment must safeguard, secure, preserve and recognize fundamental
human rights. They must provide for their protection against abuse of
any kind, including abuse by the state. Infringement and abuse of fun-
damental human rights is more ominous when executed obliquely or by
a forceful display in the misuse of powers by the state executing acts,
fundamentally prohibited by the organic nature of fundamental human
rights recognized in the Constitution, erroneously predicated on regimes
of national security, defence, public order or other considerations of
public domain.
It is illegal for both the state, created under fundamentality of human
rights in the Constitution, and the individual, enjoined in the affirmation
of life through the Constitution, to derogate, abridge or infringe basic
rights. The opinion here is that there appear to be no legally-justifiable
instances in support of restriction, abrogation or preemption of funda-
mental human rights of the individual, in particular insertion of such
restrictions or usurpation of individual rights on the same fundamental
level of original conception, upon which only the fundamental norm itself
is competent to operate. This fundamental norm cannot be preempted by
itself, but rather by something greater than the norm of fundamental
human rights. In our view, the constitution must reflect both the fellowship
and nourishment of the human spirit expressed in the unity of divergent
interests and yet similar fundamental human rights of each and every
individual. It cannot be a representation of draconian entrenchment of
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state rights and interests to the detriment of fundamental human rights
of the individual.
We therefore maintain that sustenance of sovereignty and residual
rights of state is only possible on one condition, namely that fundamental
human rights of the individual are sacred and immune from incidents of
state functionality. They must be respected and preserved at all times. No
rights of state sovereignty, polity, association or organization or grouping
of people are possible without this fundamental recognition of the sanctity
of fundamental human rights of the individual. The "winds of change"
currently sweeping Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, South Africa and
other totalitarian regimes around the world bear testimony in support of
our proposition.
We concede and endorse the concept of punishment for wrongdoing
especially when used to correct the antisocial elements of society, or to
protect the constitutional shield of unity of the people in the state. The
law and process providing for the concept of punishment in the State
must be second tier, because of the level of state creation upon which
they are predicated. Liability of inhabitants of society for wrongdoing is
based on principles of "tacit agreement" between people of a state to be
bound by societal norms. Lack of consent denotes freedom to claim
exemption from these norms. Any such state of affairs requires dissenters
to forego the benefits of organized polity and establishment of their own
system of cohabitation or alternatively seek other methods of accommo-
dation to forestall exclusion or expulsion from a particular polity. Either
a different level of compliance is secured from these individuals or they
are expendable, deemed outside the confines of pertinent structural or-
ganization of state marked by their inability to participate fully in the
political process. It is proper, therefore, that trespass to the person or
her property be specifically authorized and executed either by the state or
the individual with the full sanction and compliance to fundamentality of
the human rights tradition. Trespass on this compact by both individuals
and the state on both fundamental and second tier levels invites the
process of conciliation of rights and interests both public and private; but
even the body of conciliation is also founded on the second tier level,
permitting the government of a state to carry out functions as long as
they are not fundamentally prohibited by the norm of human rights.
Therefore, the state as an agent of the collective will of the people must
also guard against intrusion by both the individual and the state. A
number of qualifications to the proposition of an absolute concept of
fundamental human rights on the fundamental level of constitutional
orders are merited as follows.
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First, our postulations are based on the understanding and appreciation
that the joy of unrestricted freedom and liberty of the individual embodied
in the splendor of human life must be the pillar of constructing structural
patterns of state including incidents of state sovereignty. The very survival
of the human family, whether as individuals, states, organizations, etc,
must be erected on the fundamentality of individual human rights. There-
fore, state sovereignty in all of its manifestations must be brought to an
appreciable level of veneration of fundamental human rights. Tragic
lessons of history occasioned by consistent disregard of this tenet serve
as perpetual reminders of our vulnerability to machinations of state
sovereignty conceptually unsupported under the organic norms of funda-
mental human rights. The fragility of fundamental human rights is espe-
cially revealed when they are abused. Their strength, therefore, must come
from the vigilance of individuals to arrest sojourns in the private arena
of fundamental human rights of the individual.
Second, we have alluded to the concept of capital punishment to
delineate the policy attributes of this phenomenon from the fundamentality
of life protected under these Constitutions. As a sanction imposed by the
state, capital punishment is also second tier, not only because of the level
of state rights and interest, but also because of attributes of policy reflected
in a law issued by the government.
Third, our proposition excludes external interference with the nor-
mative function of domestic functionality of state sovereignty. Our prop-
osition simply translates to a tenet that the essence of law is to safeguard
and protect life and property built around it. An edifice of state to
expunge life at this fundamental level must be construed as a flaw and a
negation of the concept of fundamentality. Denial of fundamentality of
human rights similarly denies the base of society. Thus, no legal reasoning
about state sovereignty is important or fundamental enough to warrant
the demise of the rule of law by extinction of life fundamentally protected.
If any law at this fundamental level - as Constitutions of Sub-Saharan
African import - permits the state or individual to tamper with life and
basic rights derived from it, turbulence and chaos must accompany this
formulation so as to destroy society.
To avoid withering and retain a dynamism in society, law preserves
life first in a fundamental form. On a secondary level, however, influenced
by incidents of policy reflecting residual rights and interests of state, law
empowers tribunals of conciliation under protection of the collective will
of the people (not the President or Head of State, Police or State Security
Forces) to impose penalties as a remedy or redress of infringement, namely
the bargaining process between the individual and the state. In the course
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of this process, rights of the individual whether fundamental or not, are
affected. They are affected as prescribed by law including termination of
life in those countries which permit capital punishment. But even in the
case of the death penalty, the decree of a court is not issued on the same
level as the fundamental norm of human rights in the Constitution, but
under it, on a second tier where the executive branch, the legislature and
the courts and any instrument of power in the state are properly established
and function.
Modern society calls for a reappraisal in emphasis of the human rights
tradition to succinctly delineate the wide berth of individual rights and
the rights and interests of state. The ignition to this reappraisal must
necessarily be individualistic in its mobility and yet positively impacted by
the momentum of individual awareness transcending national boundaries
of state power demanding as of right complete sanctity of fundamental
human rights. The growth process of both individual and state must
incorporate a cognitive and conscious understanding of the visionary
splendor of the human rights tradition. Once this appreciation is made,
no one in our view is uniquely qualified and well equipped to protect
against state transgressions of human rights more than the individual.
Only after the achievement of such individual awareness can state instru-
ments of power be oriented and compelled by a government based on the
inviolable nature of fundamental rights of the individual.
We have argued that the demise of the colonial society as an enterprise
of domination is in principle attributable to the prescriptive lack in
recognition of fundamental human rights of the indigenous people in
orders of governance. In our view, no consolidated power base equitably
apportioning public and private rights and interests of all people in these
societies could be advanced as their foundations in perpetuity. We have
maintained that oblique or clandestine recourse by colonial governments
to the fundamental human rights of the local people through the criminal
laws, juridically misaligned their prescriptive levels of formulation in the
Constitutions at independence and in the post-independence era. Incidents
of criminal law and public order formed the basis of administration of
justice as regards respect and enforcement of inarticulate norms of fun-
damental human rights as well.
Because no specific instrument of the Constitution, custom or practice
at national state level was erected as a reference point of fundamental
human rights of the indigenous people, no strong support as the pillar of
the colonial structure was available for the sustenance of this form of
society over time. It could have survived as long as "fundamental human
rights" of settlers prescriptively or functionally could be extended to cover
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the composite of basic rights of the local people. However, decadence of
this structural edifice of colonial rule was inherent due to the very lack
of normative recognition of fundamental rights of the local people in
contradistinction to the commercial undercurrents upon which these so-
cieties were primarily founded.
Because fundamental rights enjoyed in the countries of colonizing
powers are not extendable at the discretion of this polity, similar funda-
mental rights were required to be appropriated to the local people on the
same level, content and character to sustain the resultant structures in the
colonies and vanquished territories. It is the view, here, that fundamental
human rights must always subsist in each of the inhabitant of society to
provide a fountain and wellspring for the efficacious discharge of societal
functions. Failure to ascribe this recognition in the fundamentality of
rights inherently and prima facie spells prospective disintegration of society
as constructed. Consequently, we are guided by this sentiment to postulate
a vision that oppressive regimes erected outside the milieux of fundamental
human rights must eventually give way to others solidly founded and built
on their sanctity. In the case of Commonwealth Africa, it is a paradox
that the long tradition and custom for the sanctity of the human rights
tradition as the basis of society in the United Kingdom was not similarly
extended until independence of British colonies. However, because of the
already prevalent system to regulate basic rights subject to incidents of
public domain, the level of prescription inserted in the independence
Constitution of fundamental human rights intertwines both the funda-
mental level of norms of human rights and second tier level upon which
state is created and functions.
We are encouraged by the fundamentality of human rights as the basis
of state functions to visualize eradication of apartheid in South Africa
and other oppressive regimes around the world based on the inner force
and power of fundamental human rights themselves. The dignity of
humanity in our view is such that it eventually must rise up in triumph.
In post-independent Sub-Saharan Africa, including Nigeria and Zam-
bia, the formulation of fundamental human rights on the organic norm
of the Constitution and their preemption by intertwinement of both the
organic norm and second-tier levels of state functions follows the pattern
of colonial formulations. But, because the second tier level is conceptually
incapable of adversely affecting the organic norm of fundamental human
rights, we continue to witness unwarranted conflicts and tensions between
individual human rights and residual rights and interests of state. The
two levels are closely connected to one another, except that the premodial
characteristics of fundamental human rights are by their nature, formu-
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lation and application the source of legitimacy of second tier norms
(namely, state sovereignty, state rights, policy of a government and laws
combining both policy and ostensible societal input to realize interests of
state). It follows that a legislative measure, whether contained in the
Constitution itself or issued under it, must be conscionable under the joy
and merriment of norms of fundamental human rights in the Constitution.
Any governmental measure which does not withstand the test of compli-
ance with fundamental human rights is null and void (i.e. has no legal
effect). It is invalid for its repugnancy to the supremacy of the Instrument
representative of the collective will of the People. It is also profoundly
illegitimate because it usurps and destroys the warm embrace and protec-
tion offered to all by the sanctity and fundamentality of human rights.
We hold, therefore, that there is no exception to the illegality of
torture, forced labor, slavery and other forms of cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment even for those who are incarcerated. Any labor
or military service or punishment authorized by law is governed by
numerous laws in Nigeria and Zambia to support state structures and
consonant constitutional mechanism. 95
Any singular torture, forced labor or punishment not authorized by
law is prohibited under the provisions of fundamental human rights in
the Constitutions. The view here is that there is no exception to the
fundamentality of human rights so prescribed. This prohibition is rein-
forced by the numerous legislative enactments cited above. They also cater
to the exigencies of national service, armed forces, defence, labor per-
missible as punishment and civic communal activities, etc. These are the
95. Note, for example, statutory enactments in both Nigeria and Zambia relating to public
order, state or national security, criminal law and others adequately safeguarding second-tier rights
of others and also protecting rights and interests of state irrespective of the archaic nature of some
of these measures. In Zambia for example, these include the Explosives Act 1929, ch. 106; Trading
with the Enemy Act 1939 ch. 103; Public Order Act 1955, ch. 104; Societies Act, ch. 105; Preservation
of Public Security Act 1964 and Regulations of 1960, ch. 106; Protected Places Act 1960, ch.. 107;
Emergency Powers Act 1960, ch. 108; State Security Act 1969, ch. 110 and the Fire Arms Act 1970
ch. I1 - all contained in 2 Laws of the Republic of Zambia (rev. ed. 1972). They are legitimate
by virtue of bona fide incidents of state founded on the protection and preservation of fundamental
human rights and not their derogation or abridgement by misapplication of powers inherent in state
sovereignty. These laws are complimented by the Witchcraft Act 1914, ch. 145; Penal Code 1931,
ch. 146; Probation of Offenders Act 1953, ch. 147; Suicide Act 1967, ch. 148; Zambia Police Act
1964, ch. 133; Police Reserve Act 1950, ch. 130; Defence Act 1964, ch. 131 - all contained in 3
Laws of the Republic of Zambia (rev. ed. 1972). Others include the Criminal procedure Code 1934,
ch. 160; Extradition Act 1969, ch. 161; Extradition and Fugitive Offenders Act, ch. 162; Evidence
Act 1967, ch. 170 - all published in 4 Laws of the Republic of Zambia (rev. ed. 1972) Similar
legislation is available in Nigeria except for the Emergency Powers Act.
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only legal instances for their execution in second tier formulation. But
these measures do not permit institutions of the state to order torture,
cruel and unusual punishment, forced labor, etc., on some theory that
the State possesses unlimited license to do so obtained by recourse to its
sovereignty under ostensible sanction of the organic norm of fundamental
human rights. Such a proposition would be an illegal act of the State. It
is because of this primary reason that the Constitution fundamentally
prohibits these activities that second tier norms manifested in the above-
cited legislation have been enacted to reinforce and enhance this funda-
mental prohibition. This prohibition is not only fundamental and consti-
tutional, but also residual as well traced to any act or rule issued under
the constitution.
All labor, military, police and other laws of public order prohibit
negation of fundamental human rights. In case of violation, however, the
state is permitted to apprehend and present the perpetrator before an
appropriate tribunal established for such purposes by law. Neither can
the tribunal impose a sentence prohibited under fundamental human rights.
Such penalty is null and void, ultra vires the Constitution. On the contrary,
stipulations in these measures attest to the following alternatives.
First, that in the case of infringement of rules therein contained for
purposes of preservation of the welfare of people erected on fundamen-
tality of rights under the sentinel of the state as an agent of the People,
a person by reference to the compact of the People may be required by
this agent of the People under authority of this Compact to render service
to the State, because it is his duty as agreed to in the Collective Will of
the People.
Second, that service to the state is reasonably required because the
individual in the role as a public servant must render it. Third, that such
service must be performed as punishment for transgressions on rights of
others including the residual rights and interests of' State. Fourth, that
prevailing circumstances in the state, such as the transient conditions of
national public emergency or an act of war, demand unequivocal deference
to the needs of the State, etc. But these orders cannot be to discharge
duties and obligations to the state which are illegal or unlawful under
organic norms of fundamental human rights in the Constitution. There-
fore, the armed forces, police or state security forces have no power to
order torture or other forms of inhuman treatment in the interests of
national security, defence, public order, or other justifications of eminent
domain. Such an order or decree is fundamentally flawed as contrary to
the spirit of sound constitutionalism offered by the organic norms of
fundamental human rights. Consequently, police or other law enforcement
agents must be penalized or sanctioned in case of violation of detainee
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or prison rights. There appears to be no single lawful instance in which
deprivation of liberty is justified without evidence of transgressions on
similar rights of others. Where these occur, appropriate process and
procedure in a formally-constituted and ordinarily recognized adjudicative
tribunal must be utilized to conciliate and ameliorate conflicting rights
and interests. On this fundamental level, in the Constitution there seems
to be no single exception when preemption, derogation, or limitation of
fundamental human rights are permissible in deference to the public
interest, because the public interest and fundamental human rights are
not on the same level. Since the public interest fundamentally must be
traced from the organic norm of basic human rights of the individual, it
is a lesser norm which must be subservient to the fundamentality of rights
of individuals.
No single instance should lawfully be permissible, nor is it legal in
the interest of national security, public defence or other public welfare
justifications to abridge the fundamental human rights of the individual.
If these public welfare interests are to protect the sanctity of the state in
unity of the individual, then such public interests cannot legitimately be
used to commit acts preempting the basis of what they are intended to
protect, namely, rights of each and every individual united as one under
the Constitution.
The entire argument is not only circuitous but also breeds absurd
constitutional questions as well. It is illogical to argue for preservation of
the public interest, if this public interest is in itself founded on protection
of victims intended to be abused by instruments of the public or state,
which in turn is an agent of each and every individual united as one.9
Continued sustenance of unity under the Constitution demands a
fundamental adoption and embrace of the totality of the human rights
tradition without exception as long as individuals do not traverse on
similar rights of others including the subordinate rights and interests of
state. If transgressions occur, the discourse is by implication second tier,
a level cognizant of the majesty of State as an agent of the People. At
this secondary level, they are subject to negotiations taking place between
the individual and state. They are affected to the extent that action of
the individual must be examined to ascertain and determine encroachment
on similar individual rights or secondary rights and interests of State.
Even on this secondary level, however, the act of state which affects
96. See generally Police in Zambia, supra note 2.
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individual rights cannot be illegal under the organic norm of fundamental
human rights, the basis of Constitutional mechanism and the State.
Furthermore, where corresponding fundamental human rights of others
are infringed, many laws of a ciiminal nature mentioned above, delineating
eminent domain and private rights in both Nigeria and Zambia, are
sufficiently particularized to address these contingencies. It is important
to separate the levels of formulation in the Constitution for a seasoned
appreciation of the organic nature of fundamental human rights.
I submit that rights of the state and policy considerations affecting
an instrument of this state function are consonant within the milieux of
sound constitutionalism, only as long as they strictly comply and subor-
dinated to the fundamentality of human rights upon which they are
founded. More than anything, the fundamentality of human rights unified
in its sanctuary by the Constitution manifests itself in the pronouncement:
We the People are united by the delicacy and yet common thread of
humanity. We the People endow ourselves with unbridled liberty to create
a structural edifice called the State. This structure constitutes a trusted
custodian or agent to whom we delegate specific functions of government.
However, We the People specifically inscribe that the fundamentality of
our humanity cannot be tampered with, because it is the basis upon which
we have created this structure called the State. Therefore, these funda-
mental rights of Who we are as People are beyond the scope of incursions
by the State, except as necessary to enforce and safeguard against
transgressions by anyone of us including the State, united in this Covenant
designated as the Constitution. Consequently, abrogation of this Covenant
including the narrow rights of State founded on our fundamental human
rights, but whose interests are varied and wide because of its functions
to secure our rights as people, merits stringent sanctions.
This mandate in our view does not incorporate usurpation of individual
rights by the State at its discretion. Unity of individuals as People is
necessary for the establishment of a polity or other forms of association
and organization such as the Nigerian and Zambian national states. The
state and government are erected under the collective will of the people
expressed in the Constitution in both their individual and collective
capacities.
The collective will of the people and the totality of rights inherent in
them are no more significant than rights of the individual who forms
the nucleus of rights contained in this association. Therefore, collective
rights of people are no more important but extensive because of the
strength inherent in unity of purpose. However, the creator of unity
is the individual at the center of all activities taking place in the polity
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or organization. Therefore, creatures of this individual cannot claim
to possess more than the unit which created them in the first place,
namely the individual. An arrangement in which the state possesses
more rights than the individual alters the source of state and
governmental power and legitimacy to constitute the state and
government as creators of the individual... This proposition is not
only morally corrupt, but is also not consistent with the natural order
of things. The Creator creates the individual, who in turn creates the
state and government. The state and government constitute sanctioned
custodians of the various units or conglomerate of individuals as people
subject to their will as creators. A successful government... hinges on
the proper understanding of this relationship.9 7
Consequently it must be deemed illegal for the state or government
to inflict penalties against anyone whose conduct is not criminal and
permissible under the norms of fundamental human rights, even though,
it may be in conflict with or contradictory to governmental policy on the
specific issue. The fact that a government executes certain foreign policy
objectives does not render this particular governmental decision more
appropriate than a personal view expressed by a citizen in the state.
Therefore, opposition to such governmental measures by the individual
or criticism of its policies does not make the individual a traitor to his
country. It merely symbolizes the utility of free participation of the
individual in the political process of her country which includes dissent
or disagreement with the government of the day.
Insofar as the state and government do not permit the individual to
transgress on the rights of others, they are also preempted from reserving
to themselves rights which properly are within the province of individual
rights. Neither are they permitted under the Constitution to share in the
rights of the individual by reference to some specific restrictions or criteria
to curtail complete enjoyment of'fundamental human rights. The Consti-
tution must recognize sanctions in case of infringement of rights as they
appertain to other corresponding individual rights. Regarding rights and
interests of state, these must be determined invariably predicated on
preservation of the sanctity of individual rights and also to ensure con-
tinuity and superiority of fundamental human rights upon which state
power finds expression.
We reiterate our views on abundance of other legislative measures
noted above in support of basic norms of fundamental human rights.
These enactments, however, are second tier, adequately providing for the
97. Police in Nigeria supra note 2.
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domain of sovereign rights and interests of the Nigerian and Zambian
states. They also sufficiently safeguard against incursions on residual rights
of others traced from norms of fundamental human rights. Others can
and should always be formulated to meet new challenges of society, but
should always be subjected to the organic norm of fundamental human
rights. Sound constitutionalism is only possible if incidents of public
domain are tested against the sanctity of fundamental human rights. If
these rights are restricted in any way, we then concede a level of ordinary
behavior capable of derogation at the whim and will of political and
dominant classes in the state. But fundamental human rights are not
theirs to subject to their discretion, determined at will whether they should
be respected, enforced and preserved depending on the mood of these
instruments of power in the state.
Fundamental human rights in our view must be so fundamentally
recognized as an imperative for the very survival of the polity under them.
Any other formulation to the contrary inherently indicates the transient
nature of the polity created outside the sanction of fundamental human
rilhts. This particular point is especially important for examination of
the sustenance of the Zambian one party state for the past seventeen
years. Without recognition and preservation of fundamental human rights,
this form of government would have followed similar unsuccessful post-
independent governments in Uganda, Lesotho, Central African Republic,
Guinea and many others. This thesis does not by implication state that
those states which have survived since independence completely adhere to
the human rights tradition. It merely attests to the fact that in the case
of Zambia with the personal commitment of President Kaunda to the
human rights tradition, the system of one party state in this country has
provided a relatively stable Zambian society notwithstanding the under-
lying inhibitions of the one party system of government. These inhibitions
manifest themselves in limitations on full participation in the political
process outside the ruling United National Independence Party (U.N.I.P.).
In itself, this is a major flaw of any one party state. In the case of
Zambia, it is compounded by continued exercise of emergency powers of
the President reflected in detention of individuals on grounds of national
security.
On the other hand, the inherent frustration of fundamental human
rights and conflicts in Nigerian society immediately before and after
independence prospectively identified the source of destruction of succes-
sive civilian and military governments, more especially during the post
civil war era. Despite certain appreciable efforts of some of these govern-
ments to maintain effective control of the structural patterns of the
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Nigerian state, these measures were conceptually negated by the very
inscription common to military forms of government: that fundamental
human rights are suspended or abrogated. Elimination of this fundamental
tenet of society itself spells the interim nature of the government. The
sanctuary of fundamental human rights is necessary for the perpetuation
of the state edifice as long as instruments of power in the state ensure
that they not only abide the fundamental norms of human rights of their
people, but also that they will vigorously enforce laws prohibiting
transgressions by anyone including the state apparatus on fundamental
human rights of the individual. Concerning levels of formulation for
fundamental human rights in the Nigerian and Zambian Constitutions (as
in other countries of Sub-Saharan Africa), permitting their functional
preponderance at this fundamental level and proscription similarly predi-
cated (as it is on second-tier levels in these Constitutions and laws issued
under them), offers some lessons in amorphous rule-formulation.
In their concurrent formulation both at the fundamental level and
second tier prescription, we also render legislative drafting a mere
repetitive exercise to rewrite normative rules already exhaustively
regulated. Therefore, a government cannot justify derogation of these
rights for example on freedom of movement due to extraordinary
circumstances themselves contained in the Constitution, but because
of the ordinary laws, rules and regulations or executive orders if
properly issued under the Constitution regulating criminality which
prescribe the lawful instances where these rights are bargainable. They
are not bargainable in the constitution even on the level upon which
state rights and interests are founded, (but under or outside the
Constitution looking into the Constitution for guidance. The only time
bargaining on the Constitution takes place is when there is a
constitutional amendment. It is for this reason referenda are utilized
to aggregate public and private rights and interests subject to
fundamental human rights)."
It is also illogical for a basic law to secure and guarantee rights one had
and then on the same level and in the same vein turn around and choke
them and essentially take them away. It is either they are preserved and
recognized to be fully enjoyed and any one who interferes with other
enjoyments individually or collectively must be subjected to the already
existing measures of criminal law balanced in a court of law under a
process of determination of breach, the norms which have been infringed,
the type of sanctions in case of guilt and the manner in which penalty
98. Id.
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will be carried out. Any government which operates under the Rule of
Law must be subjected to this proposition. The celebration of the mystery
of life demands that human rights be indeterminate in their fundamentality
and visionary dimensions. Those who violate the law especially tread on
the delicacy and yet the most protective shield of the individual against
state incursions into his private life.
It is the view here that the sanctity of law be for the tranquility of
the nation or other polity organized under organic norms of fundamental
human rights. Law in any form cannot be for destruction and violence
to the sacred nature of human rights of the individual, especially law in
the Constitution which permits operatives of the state to infringe on
fundamental human rights of the individual on some misguided notion of
state sovereignty.
It is laudable for the Constitutions of Sub-Saharan Africa including
Nigeria and Zambia, to ground authority for punishment in a subordinate
law issued under the Constitution founded on the superior norm of
fundamental human rights. Therefore, laws of treason, sedition, violence
to peace and tranquility in their countries, security of the state and state
of emergencies for a specific duration, namely general criminal laws or
norms of public order as policy of a government, are legitimately func-
tional as long as they do not offend the superiority of fundamental human
rights upon which the state finds expression. A stipulation in their Con-
stitutions that fundamental human rights are protected, but subordinated
to public order, security and welfare, reveals the following: First, that
conduct of a political activist which is not criminal under the norms of
fundamental human rights may nevertheless be prosecuted as a criminal
offense. This is where the conflict starts.
Second, because two different levels in sources of power have been
fused, there is tension in the constitutional document itself. This tension
is created by a misalignment of sources of authority for government
action. In this instance, the government is wrong to provide for punish-
ment of the political activist for any action which relates to the legitimate
and full enjoyment of fundamental human rights, merely because the
government does not agree with it. The action of the government is
erroneous, because it appeals to the rights and powers of the state as
superior to the norms of fundamental human rights of the individual.
However, because human rights of the individual are supreme and provide
the basis upon which the government is founded, we see the manifestation
of this conflict in sources of power in the detention laws for non-criminal
and political activities. It is the view here that this formulation of
fundamental human rights as restricted is a rebellious act on the part of
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the state as an agent of the people, or appropriately against We the
People as its creator.
If exercise of fundamental human rights in limited modalities of
Constitutions of Sub-Saharan Africa is fundamentally criminal in nature,
then it properly must function on the second tier level of policy justifi-
cations where state and government are free to exercise reasonable control
to enforce and balance rights of individuals. If they cannot equitably and
justly perform this function of reasonable control to balance rights and
interests both public and private, then a government established under
the mandate of the Collective Will of the People, namely the Constitution,
lacks the authority to continue to govern. Therefore, the State or Gov-
ernment is inherently incompetent to insert into the Constitution, Custom,
Practice or any other organic law which provides for its establishment
and function, measures which supersede the fundamentality of human
rights of the individual. Such an exercise eliminates the basis of govern-
mental function.
In essence, the juristic effect of attempts by constitutions of
Commonwealth Africa [including Nigeria and Zambia] to limit full
enjoyment of rights against diminished enjoyment sets these
Constitutions against themselves to self destruct. Fundamentally, even
this enunciation is also incorrect, because, there is only one source of
organism for the enjoyment, namely the fundamental human rights
provisions themselves. As such fundamental organisms cannot be used
against themselves to prescribe and formulate liability. They must be
tested against something else in the Constitution more superior than
fundamental human rights. But because, there is nothing more
fundamental than human rights under which rights and interests of
state are founded, then everything else must draw their strength from
fundamental human rights themselves unrestricted in any way."
It is concluded therefore, that under the norms of fundamental human
rights inscribed in the Constitution, no analytical or logical incident of
limitation of rights can be advanced to preempt or restrict their funda-
mentality. They cannot concurrently be fundamentally formulated and
simultaneously negated. In those permissible circumstances where they are
affected, they are subjected to the process of negotiation as bargained
between the state as an agent of the Collective Will of the People and
the individual. It is in this sense that we reserve our commentary on the
proposition of "peoples rights" in contradistinction to individual rights.
99. Id.
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Suffice to note that one of the tests for the consonance of either propo-
sition is the principle of liability or responsibility for wrongdoing and
penalties imposed as sanction.
It is rare that courts of law impose "people's punishments" except
maybe as regards punishment imposed on states within the purview of
regional or international groupings and associations, for example crimes
of war. But even in these cases individual liability is determined first
before an overall condemnation of the entire state. The point is: rights
of people either as a unit or as a conglomerate stem from individual
rights or the entity composed of a group designated as People. Once they
are united, they function as one, not to the detriment of individual rights
but to reinforce and enhance the fundamentality of the basis which united
them in the first place, namely rights of the individual. But for this
reason, that unity with others will ensure a better safeguard of individual
rights, no one needs another person, group of people, a state, a region,
sub-regions or the entire universe to come together to frustrate rights of
this individual.
Where these rights are subject to negotiations between the individual
and the state, this negotiation process takes place outside the scope of
fundamentality of the norm of human rights, namely on the second-tier
level at which the state as an agent of the people has authority to enter
into such negotiations. The theater of negotiations is not even in the
Constitution, but rather outside, looking into the Constitution. If bar-
gaining were taking place on the Constitution, the individual and the state
would be unequal partners in this process to the detriment of the individ-
ual. It also signifies alteration of the constitutional mechanism, because
the Constitution is the "melting pot" in which the condiments of Life of
People and that of the state are cooked at constant temperature. Nego-
tiation on the Constitution simply means changing the nature of the
Constitution. Thus negotiation between the state and the individual must
be outside this instrument, seeking guidance from its norms such as the
fundamental norms of human rights, second tier norms upon which the
state is created, practice, process and procedural norms, norms of en-
forcement if any, etc. All of them must be consonant with the overall
constitutional mechanism, and must especially be absolutely compliant to
the fundamentality of norms of human rights. The new approach to the
human rights tradition in the Constitutions of Commonwealth Africa
generally and Nigeria and Zambia in particular espoused above, finds
support in both the Nigerian and Zambian Constitutions. In Nigeria,
Article 30(1) of the Constitution of 1979 provides:
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Every person has a right to life, and no one shall be deprived
intentionally of his life save in the execution of the sentence of a court
in respect of a criminal offence which he has been found guilty in
Nigeria [emphasis supplied].100
Similarly, article 14(1) of the Constitution of Zambia, states:
No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the
execution of the sentence of court in respect of a criminal offence
under the law in force in Zambia of which he has been convicted
[emphasis added]. °O
Under these provisions, outside the permissible circumstances, the
taking of life by the state is illegal if carried out by the President, police,
state security forces, the courts, or a private individual under ostensible
authority of national security, public order, public welfare or morality.
If the reason for taking a life be a criminal act by anyone, the taking
must then be subjected to the requirements of these two provisions. The
effect of these provisions, therefore, is that as long as the individual does
not in any way interfere with the rights of others, the right to life is
deemed outside the scope of public domain. Similarly, other fundamental
human rights enumerated in these Constitutions are, without qualification,
immune from incidents of national security, public welfare, defense, etc.
in the same way as the fundamental right to life. In case of infringement
of any kind whatsoever, the state must then take over to conciliate and
effect enjoyment of rights through a process of negotiation involving the
perpetrator and the state.
Because the state is merely custodian, the involvement of different
branches of government ensures that representation and conciliation of
conflicting private and public interests is carried out and executed by an
entity independent of the fray between individuals or between individuals
and the state. This arbiter must be an autonomous adjudicative tribunal
specifically designed for this purpose. This process of negotiation is not
only second tier, but also influenced by policy considerations of a gov-
ernment. It is the view here that no one should maintain a right whether
as an instrument of power in the state or as an individual to be at liberty
to abridge the fundamental human rights of another.
100. Nia. CONST., art. 30(1), in Nigeria, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD
(Albert P. Blausten & Gisbert H. Flany eds. 1986), at 90.
101. ZAMBIA CONST., art. 14(1), in Zambia, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD
(Albert P. Blausten & Gisbert H. Flany eds. 1985), at 38.
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Gross violations of human rights by tyrannical governments have been
committed by deliberate misconstructions of constitutional sources of
power for government action. They have improperly manipulated law to
vest in themselves authority to abridge fundamental human rights. In our
view, neither the Constitution nor any law properly issued under it vests
such authority in any government.102 Therefore, this paper calls for the
removal of restrictions to complete enjoyment of fundamental human
rights.
C. Comparative Analysis of Human Rights Practices in Nigeria and
Zambia
Our studies of human rights practices in both Nigeria and Zambia'03
have revealed the extent and nature of abuse of fundamental human
rights in these two countries by police and state security forces. Signifi-
cantly, however, no state-supported abuse of fundamental human rights
in both countries has been reported.
In the case of Nigeria, however, Amnesty International documents
indicate that hundreds of people have been executed in that country since
the inception of military rule in 1983. For example, a number of executions
are reported as follows: 6 in 1983; 355 in 1984; and 301 in 1985.104 Though
these figures do not indicate whether they include deaths caused by police
or state security forces, they are a matter of grave concern and alarm in
the process of preservation and security of fundamental human rights in
Nigeria. Persistent reports by the press and other authorities also indicate
abuse of human rights by police and state security forces in Nigeria. 05
Though these abuses have been proven, they appear to occur outside
official sanction of government. Our research also reported systematic use
of "brutal force" by police and the Nigeria Security Organization against
those arrested, interrogated or detained.106
Furthermore, that research also indicates use of excessive force by
police and state security forces when extracting confessions. Police and
state security forces' mistreatment of prisoners or detainees or those under
interrogations appears common. Consequently, the Ministry of Internal
102. Id.
103. Police in Zambia, supra note 2, at 231.
104. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NIoERAs: TrE DEATH PENALTY (Feb. 1989: AFR 44/02/89). Ten
members of the armed forces are also reported to have been executed in March of 1986.
105. Police in Trouble, supra note 58, at 28.
106. See generally Figure IV in Police in Nigeria, supra note 2, at 567-9.
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Affairs announced in 1980 the creation of a Board of Inquiry to investigate
treatment of persons in detention centers and prisons.'07 In 1987, police
officers engaged in abuse of fundamental human rights were apprehended
with a view to prosecution.' °0 In addition, the murder of Dele Giwa in
1986 by a parcel bomb believed to have been caused by the Nigeria State
Security Service (SSS) also affected the picture of Nigerian human rights
during the course of the 1980s.1°9 It is also true that the quality of human
rights must necessarily be affected by the system of military rule as
reflected in such promulgations as Decrees 1 and 2 of 1984.
In Zambia, the functionality of the one party state is in itself restrictive
of the right to complete freedom to participate in the political process of
the state outside the parameters of party politics. The right to political
participation is not dependent on the rights of a state and its interests to
organize people in a certain fashion, but subsists on itself independently,
founded on the fundamentality of human rights themselves. Therefore,
political participation within the confines of one party rule is not a sine
qua non for freedom to unrestricted participation in the political process
of any state based on incidents of citizenship and inhabitancy in a state.
Regimes of party politics are founded on the latter and not on the former.
It is my view that an individual within the purview of the absolute
concept of fundamental human rights espoused above must be at liberty
to participate in the political process of any state in which she is a
member, notwithstanding that she does not belong to any political party
in the country. This right is as fundamental and cardinal as others for
this member of society to find justification for belonging to a particular
polity. Since no one covered by the collective will of the people, namely
the Constitution, is excludable in any way from participation in the
political process, incidents of party politics must always be cognizant of
the fact that political rights of the individual, as long as they are legal
under norms of fundamental human rights, are premodial to the function
of state rights and interests founded in second tier norms. If anything,
this is the fundamental flaw in the system of the one party form of
government.
Participation in the political process for any member of society is not
discretionary at the instance of a government or political elites and other
107. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HuMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 1980,
at 194 (1984).
108. Police in Nigeria, supra note 2.
109. 1976 Z.L.R. 136.
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dominant classes in power. It constitutes the cornerstone of being part of
the polity or organization in the first place. But for this right, no one in
essence needs to associate with anyone else. Once this association takes
place (not the association reflected by a government, but association of
people in the state), participation in the function of this association
becomes the barometer to indicate the level of day-to-day consent to be
bound by norms of this association. It is because of this sentiment and
commitment to unrestricted participation in the political process of Zambia
that we have encouraged and endorsed pluralism taking place today in
the country's political system. 110 More than ever, events in Eastern Europe
have proven this commentary more than welcome and imperative.
Prevailing regimes of national public emergency since just before
independence vest wide discretion in the President, police and state security
forces to suspend and interfere with enjoyment of fundamental human
rights. These powers are only possible in a system in which the executive
branch of government is supported by a system of political patronage
inherent in any system of one party form of government. Our research
indicates consistent allegations of abuse of fundamental human rights of
detainees, prisoners or those arrested by use of brutal force by police,
state security forces or prison officials, especially in cases dealing with
national security."' As noted above, this type of abuse is common to
both Nigeria and Zambia and merits further governmental and scholarly
investigations.
The courts in Zambia must generally be commended for their rejection
of statements and confessions obtained under duress. Their practice of
awarding compensation in proven cases of abuse by police and state
security forces is also a welcome judicial remedy in narrowing expansive
modalities of detention powers. This practice must always constitute an
integral component of judicial review of administrative action. Mistreat-
ment of prisoners or detainees was the subject of a proposed meeting in
1985 under the auspices of the Director of Public Prosecutions. Reports
of unsanitary prison conditions are an identical problem for both Zambia
and Nigeria. They provide fertile grounds of abuse of inmates' basic
rights by law enforcement agents.
110. Today Zambia is a multi-party state following the activism of the Multi-Party Movement
and other opposition groups in the country. Official government measures leading to multi-party rule
in Zambia are reflected, for example, in REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL PARLIAMENTARY SELECT Comm., APPOINTED MONDAY, JULY 9, 1990, at 1-45 (1990). For
details, see generally Police in Nigeria, supra note 2, at 33 and 41.
111. Police in Zambia, supra note 2, at 238.
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IV. Conclusion
In this comparative analysis, a number of propositions have been
espoused relative to the absolute concept of fundamental human rights in
the organism of state formation and their constitutional prescription in
both Zambia and Nigeria. Furthermore, we have also contoured para-
meters of mandate of police and state security forces in their roles,
functions and duties for efficacious preponderance of sound constitution-
alism in these countries based on the principle of reasonable control. We
have emphasized this principle as a requisite balance between the mandate
of police and state security forces in their law enforcement functions and
the tranquility of an environment, political, cultural, economic, social,
etc., for peaceful enjoyment of fundamental human rights.
We concede that the nature of contemporary national states charac-
terized by diffuse and conflicting interests necessitates an effective and
efficient machinery of law enforcement. It has been cautioned, however,
that this machinery of law enforcement must be focused primarily on the
proper law enforcement function of police and state security forces
accountable to the collective will of the people by a unit or organ in the
state ordinarily representative of their will. Invariably, this body has
traditionally meant the legislature or any of its component bodies. We
have discouraged and strongly opposed regime protection by police and
state security forces by which these law enforcement agents as instruments
of power of state are subjected to political control. We have urged their
establishment and constitution as primary tools of law directly responsive
to the Collective Will of the People and not as operatives of political and
dominant classes.
In both Nigeria and Zambia, as in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa,
functions of law enforcement agents are complicated by general devel-
opmental problems of these countries, which inter alia, pertain to rising
populations, urbanization and conflicting ethos of social stratification.
Social change is as much a factor as regimes of law and practice of police
and state security forces.
In Zambia, a general respect of fundamental human rights is more
prevalent than in Nigeria since the inception of military rule, notwith-
standing that the state functions under a one party form of government.
Therefore, evaluation of performance of police and state security forces
as they affect fundamental human rights cannot be divorced from the
political systems currently obtaining in these countries, in particular,
military rule in Nigeria. This observation also validates our earlier artic-
ulation that accountability of law enforcement agents is primarily consti-
tutional in nature.
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In Zambia, an examination of human rights practices as affected by
police and state security forces largely reveals the strength of the executive
presidency of President Kaunda and his personal commitment to the
human rights tradition. This commitment is not institutionalized so as to
demand a similar commitment by others within the party and government
hierarchy. It continues as long as the personal commitment of the President
endures and not because the system of the one party state is such that it
is primarily founded on the fundamentality of norms of fundamental
human rights. This postulate finds support in article 13 of the Zambian
Constitution as the premier article formulating security of fundamental
human rights and freedoms. It states:
It is recognized and declared that every person in Zambia has been
and shall continue to be entitled to the fundamental human rights and
freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the right, whatever his race,
place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex, but subject to
the limitations contained in article 4 and this part . ... 112 [Emphasis
added.]
Article 4 of the Constitution stipulated:
There shall be one and only one political party or organization in
Zambia, namely the United National Independence Party .... Nothing
contained in this Constitution shall be construed as to entitle any
person lawfully to form or attempt to form any political party or
organization other than the Party or belong to or assemble or associate
with or express opinion or do any other thing in sympathy with such
political party or organization." 3 [Emphasis added.]
It is submitted that Article 4 was not only formatively contradictory,
but also reflected sustained confusion to consider fundamental human
rights as second tier and discretionary at the will of political elites and
other dominant classes. If fundamental human rights as recognized in the
Zambian Constitution were deemed formulated on the organic norm
offered by fundamentality of human rights in the Constitution, therefore
institutionally secured, Article 4 finds no basis upon which it can be
predicated and would be considered null and void fundamental human
rights norms of the Constitution. However, because of the then prevailing
one party state and continuous exercise of emergency powers since just
before independence, exercise of these extensive powers has been the
112. ZAMBIA CONST., art.13, in Zambia, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD
(Albert P. Blausten & Gisbert H. Flany eds. 1985), at 38.
113. Id.*at 34.
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primary cause of abuse of fundamental human rights of detainees, pri-
soners and those under interrogations by police and state security forces,
especially as regards matters of national security.
Because of the fundamental elimination of the legislature as the power
broker of executive powers in any system of one party state, such powers
compliment the strong position of the executive branch to the detriment
of consonant development of law and the political process. Therefore,
the system of policing cannot entirely be divorced from the deeply rooted
intertwinement with the nature and system of the government of the time.
It is probable therefore, that the extent to which fundamental human
rights of any society are respected by law enforcement agents largely
depends on freedom and democratic ideals of the state in which they
function as instruments of power. Therefore, reorientation to the new
approach of human rights proposed above must commence with the
fundamental reappraisal of systems of government in Sub-Saharan Africa
including Nigeria and Zambia. In Zambia, this review supports the ter-
mination of the one party state. It also calls for the repeal of laws
providing continuous applicability of powers of detention derived from
regimes of national public emergency. These powers must necessarily be
restrained in the hands of the President, police and state security forces.
In Nigeria, we are gratified by the imminent return of civil rule in
1992. This process will address some of our concerns by the operative
effects of detention laws and suspension of fundamental human rights
under Decrees 1 and 2 of 1984.
In both countries, as in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, police and
state security forces must also be conscientized in the value and wealth
of the human rights tradition. In these countries, no challenge to their
systems of government is as formidable as the one presented by ensuring
general education for all in the proper understanding and appreciation of
the absolute nature of fundamental human rights of the individual.
Correspondingly, a free society must always facilitate a better understand-
ing of the relationship between the state and the individual including
police, state security forces, political and dominant classes themselves. As
individuals, they have no better rights than the rest of individuals in the
state. It is the strong belief here that law enforcement agents must function
humanely first before they function as instruments of power in the state.
Therefore, they must, in similar manner to that of the rest of the
inhabitants in society, fully understand and adhere to the beauty offered
by the human rights tradition.
